

# VIEW FROM THE GULF

Responses from Middle East & North African Oil & Gas  
Producers to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine



Australian  
National  
University

## Russia-Ukraine war shows cracks in US ties to Middle East allies

*The UAE and Saudi Arabia are pursuing their own interests, analysts say, as the US urges a united front against Russia's Putin.*

**ARGUMENT** *An expert's point of view on a current event.*

## Biden Should Punish Saudi Arabia for Backing Russia

Riyadh could make a difference in oil markets but has chosen to side with fellow authoritarians rather than the United States.

## 'Not our war': Gulf states resist pressure to raise oil output

## Opinion | America's Gulf 'allies' are now Putin's enablers

## Saudi, Emirati Leaders Decline Calls With Biden During Ukraine Crisis



# State narratives of Russian invasion of Ukraine

- 01 Russian Propaganda in Arabic-language media
- 02 “Not our fight”
- 03 A result of shifting world order, or Biden’s foreign policy
- 04 Hypocrisy: Where was the world when it was Palestinians/Syrians/Afghans being persecuted?
- 05 Kuwait as an exception





## Zelensky as pawn of the West:

"I think she knew [Zelensky] was a 'naive agent for the West and stupidly burned down his country for the eyes of #America and #Britain"

12:26 pm · 22 May 2022 · Twitter for iPhone



5 Retweets 5 Likes

"For the record #Ukraine is the largest area in #Europe after #Russia. An army of nearly 300,000 and a reserve of 1 million. 817 warplanes, bombers, powerful naval missiles...etc. Ukraine is a powerful country militarily. For the last 8 years the West has been offering it their best weaponry in preparation for this war."

"It will not be filthier than #American abuses in the invasion of #Iraq, and #Afghanistan and the killing of millions of Muslims"



# “Not our fight”

## Non-interference

### Responding to US disengagement in the Middle East

- Diversification of foreign relations, balancing relations
- Damage to US credibility as security partner following withdrawal from Afghanistan
- A result of shifting world order, or reaction to Biden Administration foreign policy approach
  - Including using opportunity to pressure US on Houthis

### Economic Drivers

- Russia as crucial OPEC+ member
- GCC-Russian competition for East Asian markets

### Gulf state ‘progressive’ branding

- A stark reminder, despite billions in branding to project a ‘progressive’ image to the international (esp business) community, that these states are fundamentally authoritarian





# MENA as an alternative oil supplier: practical issues

Pre-crisis, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Qatar, Iraq, Egypt, Libya & Kuwait main MENA oil and gas producers exporting to EU

- Saudi Arabia (7%) most significant MENA oil supplier

## Obstacles to increasing supply to EU

- Domestic consumption in MENA states – petrochemicals & heavy industry development
- OPEC+ production agreements
- Russia-Gulf competition over Asian markets (esp China & India)
- Hedging on Iran
- How much spare capacity do Saudi & UAE actually have?

## Opportunities

- Saudi investing since 2017 in Poland, Eastern European markets
  - Saudi claims on track to increase production capacity above 13 mbpd by 2027
- Abu Dhabi redirecting some supply to EU as of April/May
  - Asian importers such as India balking at oil price, accepting discounted Russian crude instead and freeing up MENA supply
- MENA states with low breakeven prices as crucial suppliers during renewable energy transition



# MENA as an alternative gas supplier: practical issues

Pre-crisis, Algeria (8%) and Qatar (5%) most significant MENA gas suppliers to EU

## Obstacles to increasing supply to EU

- Tight markets, long-term contracts
- Market approach differences
- Previous underinvestment, require long-term market incentives
  - Algeria hampered by slow decision-making, excessive bureaucratisation, difficult operating environment
  - Libya hampered by violence plus Russian presence via Gazprom
- EU LNG liquification/gasification terminal capacity

## Opportunities

- Some diversions of LNG cargoes from Asia to Europe (eg Japan)
- Qatar's expansion of North Field since 2017
  - LNG export capacity to go from 77 million tons per year in 2017 to 110 mtpy (2026) and, after stage 2, 126 mtpa (2027)
  - Qatar-Germany energy partnership on gas & hydrogen
- Western delegations to Algeria may improve investment in productive capacity
- Germany's recently announced construction of two LNG terminals in Wilhelmshafen and Brunsbüttel, plus floating LNG hubs





# Additional Issues

## Aligning emergency oil and gas import diversification with renewable energy goals

- The role of gas in the EU energy transition?
- Hydrogen and Ammonia market development?
  - Hydrogen production as central to energy transition planning in Middle East fossil fuel producers
  - Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership to incorporate “Africa, Europe, and the Gulf”

## Impact on Gulf states & regional politics

- High fossil fuel revenue allowing breathing room on subsidy reform, introduction of new taxes, amidst high youth unemployment
- Enhanced Gulf-Syria relations: UAE seeking to counterbalance Iran?

## Renewing an old coercive diplomatic tool: oil and gas as leverage

- Spain dragged into Algeria-Morocco dispute
- Soft (and hard) power for MENA hydrocarbon producers
  - Qatar’s soft power blitz
  - Biden to meet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman next month: an attempt to repair relations?
- Long-term repercussions of Russia’s oil & gas politics



# THANK YOU

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