ENERGY UPDATE 2023

FRANK JOTZO ANU INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE, ENERGY & DISASTER SOLUTIONS


NOVEMBER 2023



Global emissions trajectories to limit future warming

Limiting warming to **1.5°C** and **2°C** involves rapid, deep and in most cases immediate greenhouse gas emission reductions

Net zero CO₂ and net zero GHG emissions can be achieved through strong reductions across all sectors



Global Stocktake (COP28)

Paris Agreement has driven climate action

... but the world is falling far short of what is needed ... need much more ambition in future NDCs,

implementation of pledges,

support for action in developing countries

'Systems transformations' needed

... and a focus on inclusion and equity, to support an increase in ambition





Figure 2

FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Rev.1


Emissions growth rates



Implications for future world emissions trajectories

Global CO2 emissions could peak as soon as 2023, IEA reveals

Global energy-related CO2 emissions, billion tonnes




Peak CO2 is in reach:

- Renewables
- Electrification
- Slower growth eg
 China

Pledges towards net-zero keep below-2°C in reach



Renewables have made, will make the biggest difference



STEPS is the IEA 'stated policies'

scenario



Very large *potential* to cut emissions, globally

 Options for 50% emissions by 2030 identified at cost <US\$100/tCO2-eq

Large potential at very low costs

 Half of the total at cost <US\$20/tCO2-eq

Majority of low-cost potential in energy

- Esp solar, wind
- Overall reduction potential split roughly 1/3 between
 1) energy,
 2) ag/forestry/land-use
 - change,
 - 3) everything else

IPCC 6th Assessment Report, Working Group III

Many options available now in all sectors can together substantially reduce net emissions by 2030.







Figure SPM.7: Overview of mitigation options and their estimated ranges of costs and potentials in 2030

The unit costs of some forms of renewable energy and of batteries for passenger EVs have fallen, and their use continues to rise.



Supply bottlenecks are usually temporary





Supply catches up to demand, moderating price increases



Source: IEA WEO 2023 (prices), BP (production)

Outlook to 2050: A radically changing energy mix





Figure 3.1
Global total energy demand by fuel and scenario, 2010-2050

STEPS: 'stated policies', APS: announced pledges, NZE: net zero

Economic vulnerability to fossil fuel phase-down concentrated in a small set of countries


2021 extraction-based GHG emissions (GtCO2eq)



Watch for 'fossil-fuel phase-down' or 'phaseout' at COP28

Source: SEI ea Production Gap Report 2023

Are fossil fuel producing countries planning for the coming fossil fuel phase-down?



Source: SEI ea Production Gap Report 2023

Industrial decarbonization: big shifts on the horizon


Steel: Recycling, efficiency, electrification, hydrogen

Aluminium: zero-emissions electricity, process improvements

Cement: CCUS, efficiency, feedstocks

Chemicals: CCUS, hydrogen, electrification, efficiency, feedstocks

Zero-emissions supply chains are geographically different: Australia's renewable energy export opportunity



Clean energy investment growing fast, fossil fuel investment still growing gradually





Figure 2.3 Global energy investment in clean energy and fossil fuels

Investment: massive scaling up, shift from fossil to clean energy supply and new end use equipment

Figure 1.19 Investment trends as share of global GDP by scenario, 2023-2050



World energy investment ~\$3tr/yr → ~\$4-5tr/yr


Building a clean energy system with low running costs, and high up front costs.



Source: IEA WEO 2023

Investment ramp-up needed esp in developing/industrializing countries ex-China

Figure 1.18 Average annual clean energy investment needs by region/country in the NZE Scenario, 2022-2050



Where will all the extra investment come from?

Global energy and climate policy: factors of influence

Looking inward: Rise of nationalism, isolationism

(--) Diverts from climate policy, and from international cooperation

(+/-) Can go either way on energy policy – focus on domestic supplies, industry leadership

Geostrategic shifts: Anticipating conflict

(--) Diverts resources to security, military

(+) Can favour renewables re energy supply security

Cost-of-living: democratic reverberation

(--) Detracts from climate objectives, scarcer fiscal resources

(+) Can favour investment toward lower energy prices




Global energy and climate policy: some trends

More policy that supports energy transition

- Emissions trading/taxes on the rise
- Many other support measures for clean energy, lower emissions, transition from fossils
- Rising appetite for border carbon measures


Increasing focus on industry policy

- US Inflation Reduction Act accelerates (or diverges?) clean energy/industry investment
- Competition for leadership in green technology, manufacturing, supply chains



Australia's emissions profile and trends

Figure 2 Australia's emissions projections in the baseline scenario, 1990 to 2035, Mt CO₂-e




Reductions since 2005 almost entirely from land use, land use change and forestry

... and more recently, reductions in electricity emissions

Shown here are the 2022 emissions projections – 2023 issue due this week


Source: Australian Government, Australia's Emissions Projections 2022

Electricity generation mix, NEM, 1999-2022 Wind+solar: 2022 27%, 2017 9%




Source: AEMO via OpenNEM

Electricity generation mix, NEM, 21-27 Nov 2023



Electricity generation mix, South Australia, 21-27 Nov 2023



Source: AEMO via OpenNEM

Australia's emissions targets

43% at 2030

- Projections: target will be just about met
- Involves assumption of 82% renewables by 2030
- Only gradual change in industry, transport, agriculture

2035 target?

- What Australia 'should' do as a contribution towards <2°C, vs what can be done short of an all-out effort
- CCA advice, government's sector-based net-zero plans

Electricity policy

Supporting investment in wind, solar, storage: the Capacity Investment Scheme

New policy: federal government underwriting of revenue for electricity (min/max price contracts)

Main alternative would have been extending the RET

CIS disadvantages: direct government involvement, budget exposure

CIS advantages: greater steering by government, lower and more stable consumer prices

Argument: low power prices the key for political sustainability & electrification

Other hurdles

Supply chain bottlenecks, incl skilled labour

Transmission, also with regard to social licence at local level

Coal-plant shutdown fears



Facilitating the transition

Net Zero Energy Agency → Net Zero Authority

Defining its role... among existing Federal and State departments and agencies

- Easing regional and social transition, esp in coal regions
- Facilitating green investment
- A role in industry policy?



Australia's inherent advantage in the shift to net-zero emissions

Australia as a resource and energy supplier in a net-zero world economy

- Exports large amounts of embodied renewable energy: fuels (H2, NH3, CH3OH), processed metals (green iron, aluminium), other resources (lithium, copper, rare earths...)
- Replacing coal & gas revenue

Australia as a carbon dioxide removalist

- The 'net' in net zero refers to carbon dioxide removal
- Australia has preconditions for large-scale technological CDR
 - ... eg direct air capture, enhanced weathering
- Who pays?

Industry policy: government stance

Objectives

"competitiveness, distribution of opportunity, resilience and national security - all anchored to our climate and energy goals"

Priority areas for industry policy

"Refining and processing critical minerals.

Supporting manufacturing of generation and storage technologies, including batteries.

Producing renewable hydrogen and its derivatives like ammonia.

And forging green metals."

2 November 2023

Keynote address to the Economic and Social Outlook Conference, Melbourne

Energy, the economy, and this defining decade



Hydrogen Headstart:

\$2b production credits, with competitive bidding

Industry policy: some fundamentals and principles

Australia is not America

USA (EU, East Asia): large economies, domestic market, manufacturing base, strategic objectives

Australia: comparative advantage in resource base, feeding into international markets

Relationship bw domestic energy transition and export industries

short term competition for resources, long term complementarities

Ensuring benefits to Australia

Focus on enabling Australia's comparative advantage, productivity Value-for-money for public expenditure Indigenous and local communities, environmental impacts Future tax returns





Thank you

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